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Abstract 
A simple Tullock contest model is used to predict levels of effort in English professional football (soccer). The effort of 
the teams is reflected in the numbers of fouls committed and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded. Effort levels 
are found to be higher in matches between evenly talented teams, confirming the idea that asymmetries result in lower 
effort by participants. The results also suggest that teams’ effort levels are strategic complements.  
Keywords: Tullock contest, English football, asymmetries, strategic complements 
1. Introduction 
Tullock’s (1980) contest model is a standard tool in economics and is well known in the literature on tournaments, 
contests, and rent-seeking games. Corchon (2007) reviews this literature. In a winner-take-all contest, the model defines 
the ex ante probability of winning as a ratio of each contestant’s investment relative to the sum of investments supplied 
by all contestants. In general, however, the Tullock model does not predict whether effort is a strategic substitute or 
complement in the sense of Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer (1985); this depends upon the payoff structure. 
Empirical applications of the Tullock model are rare, due in part to the non- observability of effort. For example, data 
on bribes and the transfer of intangible assets in rent-seeking contests may be unobtainable. This paper contributes to 
the non-experimental empirical Tullock contest literature (Note 1). The behavior of teams in English professional 
football (soccer) is modeled as a Tullock contest. One important influence on the outcome of football matches (apart 
from underlying team quality) is the contributed effort of the teams. Working hard to press the opposition and make 
tackles will eventually result in foul play and yellow and red cards being awarded. Therefore, effort is measured by the 
numbers of fouls committed by the home and away teams, and the numbers of yellow and red cards awarded against 
each team (Note 2).  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model. Section 3 describes the 
data and the empirical model. Section 4 reports the empirical results; and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical Framework 
This section develops a simple contest model for football match outcomes. Before the match, each manager (coach) 
decides independently on the conduct of his team: specifically, whether the team will work hard to tackle players of the 
opposition. Effort is measured by a continuous variable ie >0, where i=1, 2 denotes the home and away teams. Greater 
effort carries a cost, because it increases the probability that a player receives a caution (yellow card) or is dismissed 
from the field of play for the remainder of the game (red card). A red card leads to a suspension, preventing the player 
from appearing in either one, two or three of his team’s next scheduled games. A player who accumulates five (ten) 
yellow cards in different games within the season before 31 December (10 April) receives a one (two) match suspension. 
The marginal cost of effort, denoted ci, may differ between teams. The marginal cost of effort is higher the larger is the 
number of injured and suspended players in team i’s playing squad, and the smaller is the overall size of the squad 
(Note 3). 
Both teams’ effort levels influence the probabilities for the match outcome. For simplicity, the theoretical model is 
developed by incorporating the following weighted sum of the home team’s win probability and the draw probability 
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into the teams’ expected payoff functions: p(e1, e2)=prob(home win) +0.5prob(draw). p(e1, e2) is the home team’s 
success probability, and 1 - p(e1, e2) is the away team’s success probability (Note 4). 
The teams are assumed to be heterogeneous in underlying quality, and an asymmetric contest model is required 
(Corchon, 2000). The absolute quality if team i, which is common knowledge before the match, is denoted i. 
Home-field advantage, arising from the support the home team receives from the crowd and from any possible 
refereeing bias (Dawson, Dobson, Goddard & Wilson, 2007), is represented by a parameter h. The home team’s prior 
success probability, defined for e1=e2=0, is  
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We assume that p(e1, e2) is increasing in e1 and decreasing in e2 over the range of realistic values for e1 and e2 that any 
team would select. For extreme values of e1 (for example) beyond this range, p(e1, e2) might be decreasing in e1, 
because extreme effort raises team i’s probability of having players dismissed to a level that reduces team i’s probability 
of success in the current match. It is obvious, however, that teams seeking to maximize their own success probabilities 
would not select such extreme values of e1 or e2. Accordingly, the possible negative relationship between the levels of 
effort and the success probability at extreme values of e1 or e2 is not represented by (2).    
The expected payoffs for teams 1 and 2 are 
22221111 - )-1(,- ecUpecpU           (3) 
where Ui represents the gross payoff (before deducting the cost arising from greater effort) to team i from winning the 
match (Note 5). Ui depends on the importance of the match to team i. For example, Ui is large if team i is near the top of 
its divisional league table and in contention for the championship, qualification for European competition, or promotion 
to a higher division. Ui is also large if team i is near the bottom of its divisional table and in danger of relegation to the 
division below. Ui is small when team i is out of contention for any of these end-of-season outcomes. 
The absolute team quality measures 1 and 2 are determined by the quality of playing talents, the ability of the 
managers, and the teams’ tactical capabilities. All of these determinants may vary over time, even within a football 
season. Prior to each match, the team managers select e1 and e2 so as to maximize their teams’ expected payoffs. The 
non-cooperative solution for the equilibrium levels of effort is 
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From contest theory it is well known that the response of the strategic variable (the level of effort) to a small change in 
the payoffs and the individual costs depends upon the levels of the payoffs and costs. The partial derivatives of (4) with 
respect to the home team win payoff U1 and with respect to the marginal cost of effort c1 are 
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Equivalent results can be derived for small changes in the away team’s win payoff. In (5), )∂/∂(∂/∂ 1
*
11
*
1 ceUe  is 
unambiguously positive (negative). This leads to  
Result 1: An increase in the payoff from a win for either team will unambiguously increase that team’s level of effort. An 
increase in the own cost of effort will unambiguously decrease that team’s level of effort.    
The effect on effort of an increase in the opposing team’s payoff from a win is ambiguous, and the effect of an increase 
in the opposing team’s marginal cost of effort is also ambiguous. We focus on an increase in U1, which leads to the same 
qualitative results as a decrease in c1. In (5), 1
*
2 ∂/∂ Ue  is positive (negative) if 
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rU1 and (1-r)U2 are the two teams’ expected prior payoffs. The away team will increase (decrease) its level of effort if 
its relative expected prior payoff - compared to the home team - is larger (smaller) than its relative marginal cost of 
effort. In this case, there is more (less) at stake for the away team, taking into account the relative costs of effort. As a 
result, the away team responds with a higher (lower) level of effort to an increase in the home team’s gross payoff. 
By substituting (4) into (2), the equilibrium solution for the home team’s success probability is 
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Comparing (6) with (1), the home team’s equilibrium success probability is larger (smaller) than its prior success 
probability (i) if the home team’s win payoff is larger (smaller) than the away team’s win payoff, and effort costs are 
identical, and (ii) if the home team’s marginal costs of effort are smaller (larger) than the away team’s marginal costs of 
effort and payoffs are identical. Equation (6) shows that ci and Ui play similar roles in the model. Finally, the values of r 
at which the teams’ levels of effort are maximized are derived from (4) for c1=c2. The maximum value of e1 is obtained 
when r = U2/(U1+U2), and the maximum value of e2 is obtained when r = U1/(U1+U2). This leads to 
Result 2: Assuming identical marginal costs of effort, if the teams’ payoffs from a win are the same, the teams’ levels of 
effort are maximized when the game is evenly balanced after allowing for home-field advantage, in the sense that each 
team has a prior success probability of 0.5. If the teams’ payoffs from a win are unequal, the teams’ levels of effort are 
maximized when the prior success probability of the team with the larger (smaller) payoff is below (above) 0.5.   
3. Data and Empirical Model 
The data for the empirical analysis comprises all 12 216 games played in the English Premier League (the Premiership) 
and the three divisions of the English Football League (currently known as the Championship, League One and League 
Two) during the six football seasons from 2001/02 to 2006/07 (inclusive). The data source is www.football-data.co.uk. 
The dependent variables in the empirical models are the numbers of fouls committed by each team per game, and the 
numbers of yellow and red cards awarded against each team per game.   
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the fouls, yellow and red cards data. The sample means for the numbers of fouls 
awarded against the home and away teams are 12.4 and 13.1 per game, respectively. Although the number of fouls per 
game takes the form of count data, the number of cells appears sufficiently large to justify treating these data as 
continuous. Accordingly, the fouls equations are estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The 
interdependence between the fouls committed by the home and away teams is captured by the contemporaneous 
correlation between the disturbances of the home and away team equations.  
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics: Fouls, Yellow Cards and Red Cards  
 
Number 
of fouls, 
F 
Number of games in 
which F fouls were 
awarded against: 
 
Number 
of yellow 
cards, Y 
Number of games in 
which Y yellow cards 
were awarded against: 
 
Number 
of red 
cards, R 
Number of games in 
which R red cards 
were awarded against: 
Home 
team 
Away 
team 
Home 
team 
Away 
team 
Home 
team 
Away 
team 
0-4 167 143 0 3535 2294 0 11 353 10 856 
5-9 2762 2203 1 4172 3644 1 817 1263 
10-14 5818 5561 2 2829 3287 2 43 92 
15-19 2924 3464 3 1184 1905 3 3 4 
20-24 503 778 4 389 754 4 0 1 
25+ 42 67 5+ 107 332    
Total 12 216 12 216 Total 12 216 12 216 Total 12 216 12 216 
Mean 12.4007 13.1212 Mean 1.2687 1.6957 Mean 0.0747 0.1198 
St. dev 3.9759 4.1345 Variance 1.2834 1.6706 Variance 0.0776 0.1234 
The sample means for the numbers of cards awarded against the home and away teams per game are 1.2687 and 1.6957 
(yellow) and 0.0747 and 0.1198 (red), respectively. In this case the numbers of cells are small, necessitating the use of 
count data regression models. As Table 1 shows, the sample variances are similar to the sample means, which suggests 
that the Poisson distribution is a suitable probability model. The yellow and red cards equations are estimated using a 
bivariate distribution obtained from the convolution of two univariate zero-inflated Poisson probability functions via the 
Frank copula (Lee, 1999) (Note 6). The copula function contains a parameter that controls for interdependence between 
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the cards awarded against the home and away teams. The bivariate cards regressions reported in Section 4 express the 
log-mean number of cards for each team as a linear function of covariates that are defined below. 
According to the theoretical analysis developed in Section 2, the teams’ strategic choices for their levels of effort 
depend upon two factors: (i) differences between the payoffs from a win for each team; and (ii) the degree of balance or 
imbalance between the teams’ prior success probabilities. Controls are included for (i) and (ii), and for one further 
non-strategic determinant of the levels of foul play: (iii) weaker teams that tend to spend more of the game defending 
are expected to commit more fouls and collect more cards than stronger teams that spend more time attacking.  
In controlling for (i) above, it is assumed that the two teams’ payoffs from a win may differ once a stage of the season 
has been reached at which some teams have dropped out of contention for championship, European qualification, 
promotion or relegation outcomes. The 0-1 dummy variable HSIG = 1 if the game is significant for end-of-season 
outcomes for the home team, and ASIG = 1 if the game is significant for the away team. The algorithm that determines 
whether the game is significant assesses whether it is arithmetically possible (before the game is played) for the team to 
win the championship, qualify for European competition, be promoted or be relegated, if all other teams currently in 
contention for the same outcome take one league point on average from each of their remaining games (Note 7).  
In order to control for (ii) and (iii) above, relative team quality is measured using HPROB=prob(home 
win)+0.5prob(draw). HPROB corresponds to the variable r, the home team’s prior success probability, in the 
theoretical model. A numerical value for HPROB for each of the N=12 216 sample games is generated from the results 
forecasting model described in full by Goddard (2005) (Note 8). Included among the covariates of this model are HSIG 
and ASIG (as defined above), which control for the effect of incentives on the result probabilities. In the present case, 
HPROB should reflect prior success probabilities, which depend upon the underlying quality of the two teams, but 
should not incorporate any incentives effects. Therefore in generating HPROB from the forecasting model, we reset the 
values of HSIG and ASIG to zero for the (out-of-sample) games for which the forecasts are produced.      
A convenient measure of the competitiveness of the game, or uncertainty of game outcome, is UNCERT = HPROB(1–
HPROB). UNCERT is maximized when HPROB=0.5. A positive relationship is expected between UNCERT and the 
numbers of fouls and cards awarded. Table 2 reports summary statistics for the HPROB, UNCERT, HSIG and ASIG 
covariates.   
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics: Hprob, Uncert, Hsig and Asig 
 Mean Standard 
deviation 
1st quartile 2nd quartile 3rd quartile 
HPROB 0.5922 0.0938 0.5312 0.5955 0.6555 
UNCERT 0.2327 0.0203 0.2251 0.2398 0.2475 
HSIG 0.9501 - - - - 
ASIG 0.9510 - - - - 
Finally, the estimations include controls for several other factors that might be expected to influence the number of fouls 
committed and cards awarded. Individual football season dummy variables control for changes over time in the content 
and interpretation of the rules relating to foul play; referee fixed effects control for variation among referees in the 
propensity to award fouls and cards; and individual team fixed effects control for other unobservable differences 
between teams (Note 9). 
4. Empirical Results 
The estimation results are reported in Table 3. Column (1) reports the SUR estimations for the numbers of fouls 
committed by the home and away teams, and columns (2) and (3) report maximum likelihood estimation results for the 
bivariate regressions for the numbers of cards awarded against the home and away teams.  
Table 3. Estimation Results  
 Home team Away team 
 Fouls Yellow 
cards 
Red 
Cards 
Fouls Yellow 
cards 
Red 
cards 
HSIG 0.028 
(0.17) 
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
-0.087 
(-0.53) 
0.244
*
 
(1.41) 
0.112
**
 
(2.04) 
0.201
*
 
(1.35) 
ASIG 0.353
**
 
(2.14) 
0.119
***
 
(2.52) 
0.569
***
 
(2.62) 
0.299
**
 
(1.70) 
0.241
***
 
(4.41) 
0.349
**
 
(2.21) 
HPROB -1.340
**
 
(-2.22) 
-0.889
***
 
(-4.71) 
-0.190 
(-0.31) 
1.918
***
 
(2.91) 
0.606
***
 
(2.89) 
0.775
*
 
(1.47) 
UNCERT 8.060
***
 
(2.84) 
0.593 
(0.69) 
6.643
**
 
(2.11) 
12.637
***
 
(4.32) 
1.941
**
 
(2.05) 
4.916
**
 
(2.05) 
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Notes: the fouls equations are estimated as Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR). The yellow and red cards 
equations are estimated as a bivariate Poisson regression. Ancillary parameters (allowing for interdependence 
between the home team and away team fouls or cards, and the zero-inflation parameter) are not reported. Additional 
controls included in these regressions are individual effects for (i) football seasons, (ii) teams and (iii) referees. 
Coefficients are not reported. *,**,*** denote coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively, 
one-tail tests. z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
The coefficients on HSIG in the equations for home-team fouls and cards are insignificant, while the coefficients on 
ASIG are positively signed and significant at the 10% level or lower, using one-tail tests. The coefficients on HSIG and 
ASIG in the equations for away-team fouls and cards are positively signed and significant at the 5% level or lower.  
These results provide some support for Result 1 (see Section 2), and suggest that football teams’ strategies are 
influenced by the magnitudes of their own payoffs. However, the tendency to exert more effort if end-of-season 
championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes are at stake, and exert less effort if nothing is 
at stake, appears more pronounced for away teams than for home teams. A possible interpretation is that away teams 
tend to ‘ease off’ in unimportant end-of-season games; while home teams, perhaps more highly conscious of the critical 
scrutiny of their own supporters, feel obliged to demonstrate maximum commitment at all times. According to the 
theoretical model developed in Section 2, the relationship between the opposing team’s payoff and each team’s own 
strategy is ambiguous. Empirically, however, the results reported in Table 3 suggest that teams tend to exert more effort 
if the opposing team has end-of-season championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes at 
stake, and exert less effort if nothing is at stake.  
The coefficients on UNCERT are positively signed (as expected) in every case. Two of the three coefficients on 
UNCERT for the home team (in the fouls and the red cards equations) are significant at the 5% level or below, and all 
three coefficients on UNCERT for the away team are significant at the 5% level or lower. These findings are consistent 
with Result 2 (see Section 2). Football teams tend to exert more effort in games involving teams that are evenly 
balanced, and exert less effort if there is a large disparity between the quality of the two teams.  
Finally, the coefficients on HPROB are negatively signed in the equations for the home team, and positively signed in 
the equations for the away team. Two of the three coefficients on HPROB for the home team are significant at the 5% 
level or lower, and all three coefficients on HPROB for the away team are significant at the 10% level or lower. These 
results indicate that weaker teams (as measured by the prior success probability) tend to commit more fouls and collect 
more cards than stronger teams. 
5. Conclusion 
Tullock’s contest success function has been widely used in the contest theory literature. Although the Tullock model 
provides a number of testable predictions about the behavior of agents in winner-take-all contests, empirical 
applications have been few and far between due to constraints on the availability of suitable data. This paper makes 
progress on testing the implications of the Tullock contest model using data from English professional football. In the 
empirical model the effort of the teams is reflected in the numbers of fouls committed and the numbers of yellow and 
red cards awarded. Effort tends to be higher in matches between evenly balanced teams, thus confirming a well known 
result that asymmetries will reduce contributions by participants (teams). It is also found that teams’ behavior 
(especially those playing away) alters in matches that matter: levels of effort are higher when end-of-season 
championship, European qualification, promotion or relegation outcomes are at stake. The empirical results also suggest 
that the teams’ levels of effort are strategic complements.  
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Notes 
1
 There is a large literature that tests the implications of the contest model (or variants of it) using experimental data 
(e.g., Harbring & Irlenbusch, 2003; Harbring, Irlenbusch, Krakel & Selton, 2007; Müller & Schotter, 2007; Sheremeta, 
2009). While this literature is clearly useful, it is not obvious that behaviour under stylized laboratory conditions 
generalises to real world situations.      
2
 Teams that make more (less) effort to tackle the opposition can expect to commit more (fewer) fouls and collect more 
(fewer) yellow and red cards than teams that make less (more) effort. A foul in football is an unfair act by a player 
against an opponent which is deemed by the referee to contravene Law 12 of the Laws of the Game. If the referee 
judges the foul play to be serious he may decide that it warrants a disciplinary sanction (yellow or red card) in 
accordance with Law 12. A yellow card is awarded for less serious transgressions. There is no further punishment 
within the game, unless the player commits a second similar offence, in which case a red card is awarded and the player 
is expelled for the rest of the game (with no replacement permitted). A red card, also known as a sending-off or 
dismissal, is awarded for more serious offences and results in immediate expulsion (again, with no replacement 
permitted).  
3
 The costs of effort may change within a game, for example if one player has been sent off and a further red card would 
weaken the team disproportionately. Caliendo and Radic (2006) show that the timing of such events can be important 
for game outcomes. Consideration of changes during a game would produce similar theoretical results to those across 
games. 
4
 This formulation ensures that the two teams’ success probabilities sum to one, and by so doing simplifies the algebra 
without any loss of generality. The weight attached to prob(home win) in the definition of p(e1,e2) is twice the weight 
attached to prob(draw). Therefore by assuming (below) that the teams’ expected gross utility payoffs from the game are 
obtained by multiplying the utility value of a win by p(e1,e2), it is assumed implicitly that the utility value of the draw is 
half the utility value of the win. In accordance with expected utility theory, under the league points system of three 
points for a win and one point for a draw, this set-up implies risk aversion on the part of team managers. Other 
weightings for the utility values of the win and the draw can be accommodated by the model without affecting 
fundamentally any of the results that are derived below, but at the cost of introducing some additional algebraic 
complexity. 
5
 Payoffs are normalized such that a loss implies a zero gross payoff. 
6
 The marginal probability function for zi = number of yellow or red cards awarded against the home team (i=1) and 
away team (i=2) is denoted fi(zi)=exp(–i)
iz
i /zi ! for zi=0,1,2,... The joint distribution function is constructed by 
substituting the two univariate distribution functions, Fi(zi), into the Frank copula. The bivariate joint distribution 
function is:  
G[F1(z1),F2(z2)] = 








1)exp(
}1)](}{exp[1)]({exp[
1ln
1 2211



zFzF
, where   0 is an ancillary parameter. 
The zero-inflated joint probabilities are: (1–)P(z1,z2)+D(z1,z2), where P(z1,z2) is the bivariate joint probability function 
corresponding to G[F1(z1),F2(z2)], D(0,0)=1 and D(z1,z2)=0 for (z1,z2)(0,0), and  is an ancillary parameter. The 
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zero-inflated adjustment allows the probabilities for the cell (z1=0,z2=0) to be larger than is suggested by the Poisson 
distribution: an empirical regularity that is evident in the current data. 
7
 Alternative algorithms, based on different assumptions concerning the average performance of competing teams over 
their remaining games, alter the classification of a small proportion of games at the margins, but the implications for the 
estimation results are negligible. 
8
 This model generates probabilities for home win, draw and away win outcomes, based solely on historical data that are 
available prior to the game in question. Full details are reported in Goddard (2005), and are not repeated here. 
9
 The season dummies are Ss = 1 if the game is played in season s; 0 otherwise (s represents seasons 2002/03 to 2006/07 
inclusive; 2001/02 is the reference category). The referee fixed effects are Rr = 1 if the game is officiated by referee r; 0 
otherwise (r=1...106 represents referees who officiated at least 30 games within the observation period; those referees 
who officiated fewer than 30 games each form the reference category). The team fixed effects are constant over all 
home games or away games for each team. 
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